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I. Introduction 
There is much speculation, both in the press and in general public discourse, and 
scholarship regarding the role and impact of female politicians. Influential females are 
rising to political prominence in increasingly high numbers, which has led to debate 
regarding the comparative effectiveness of female legislators, a historically 
underrepresented group. Although female representatives still make up less than a quarter 
of the House of Representatives, the number of women in the House has increased 
substantially over the past few decades. In the 2018 midterm election, a historic number 
of women were elected to the House of Representatives. Currently there are 102 female 
House representatives, which makes women 23.4% of the 435 members (CAWP). In 
1993, the beginning of the period during which this study is focused, there were 48 
female representatives, which accounted for 11.03% of the total members of the House. 
Of the 48, 36 were Democrats and 12 were Republicans. By 2010, the last year in this 
study, there were 79 women in the House, which accounted for 18.16% of the total 
representatives. Of the 79, 62 were Democrats and 17 were Republicans.  
The increase in female representation in Congress has led the public to predict 
that “the women in Congress would bring a style of lawmaking that was ‘less 
confrontational, [and] more willing to reach reasoned, bipartisan compromise’” (Bauer et. 
al 2016). Female and male legislators alike have acknowledged the important role that 
women play in fostering cooperation during times of political tension. In discussing 
women’s roles in ending the 2013 government shutdown, Senator Susan Collins (R-ME) 
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stated of women, “Although we span the ideological spectrum, we are used to working 
together in a collaborative way” (Jackman 2013). Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and 
Mark Pryor (D-AR) noted that their female colleagues deserve most of the credit for 
pushing the compromise to reopen the government (Jackman 2013).  
These assertions seem to support the conclusion that females are more likely to 
behave in a bipartisan manner than their male counterparts. Working across the political 
aisle is seen as both important and necessary in effective governing. In an increasingly 
partisan era (Poole and Rosenthal 2014), female politicians could be the answer to 
increasing bipartisan cooperation. Although the number of females in the House is 
relatively small, it is important to ask how the increase in women has already impacted 
bipartisan relations. Specifically, I assess how the increase in female legislators in the 
House of Representatives has related to the percentage of bipartisan cosponsors on House 
bills. Answering this question could provide key insight into the benefits of increasing 
female representation, which would strengthen the argument for electing women to 
office. 
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II. Literature Review 
The House of Representatives 
 The United States House of Representatives is the lower chamber of the 
legislative branch of the U.S. government. In the House there are 435 legislators, one 
from each of the 435 Congressional districts across the United States. Representatives are 
elected every two years, corresponding with each two-year session of Congress. The 
number of representatives from each state corresponds to the population of that state. The 
number of representatives from each state changes as that state’s population become 
larger or smaller relative to the other states, based on the US Census data that is collected 
every ten years. The primary role of a representative is to draft legislation, which can 
occur in the form of bills, simple resolutions, concurrent resolutions, and joint 
resolutions. The legislation must pass in the House and in the Senate, the upper chamber 
of the legislative branch, before it is sent to the President for final approval.  
I choose to look at the House of Representatives, as opposed to the Senate, for a 
few reasons. Given that the number of representatives from a state is based on that state’s 
population, the House is the more representative body. Additionally, prior to the 21st 
century, there were fewer than ten female legislators in the Senate, making analysis of the 
impact of female Senators difficult. I focus only on bills in this study, as is the precedent 
within the field (Gagliarducci and Paserman 2016). This decision is because bills have 
the force of law, and are the most substantial method for promoting a legislative agenda 
compared to other forms of legislation.  
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I choose to look at the aggregated bipartisan efforts of the House as a whole, 
rather than looking at the actions of individual legislators, because I am interested in 
seeing if even the addition of a small number of female legislators make a noticeable 
impact at the chamber level. While it is interesting to note individual behavior, the public 
observes, and is affected by, the collaborative nature of the body as a whole. 
Additionally, previous studies on this topic have tended to evaluate the bipartisan efforts 
at the bill level or individual legislator level (Andris et. al 2015; Gagliarducci and 
Paserman 2016; Paludi 2016; Bauer et. al 2017). I want to expand on previous studies by 
approaching the topic at the Congressional level.  
Cosponsorship 
 Every bill introduced in the House of Representatives has a primary sponsor. This 
individual is most strongly associated with the content of the bill, and is generally 
responsible for garnering support for the bill. Each bill can be signed by any amount of 
cosponsors, who are individuals that want to be associated with the content of the bill but 
are secondary to the sponsor. There is a general agreement in literature that a bill’s 
sponsor has a responsibility to promote the bill’s passage through the chamber, and that 
attracting cosponsors to the bill is an effective means of moving the bill through the 
legislative process (Wowro 2001; Wilson and Young 1997). Wowro (2001) finds that if a 
bill has a large number of cosponsors, the representative has been able to convince others 
that the bill is worth supporting.  
I define bipartisan cosponsorship as an instance in which a legislator not from the 
party of the bill’s sponsor signs on as a cosponsor of that bill. I count Independent 
representatives as bipartisan cosponsors for the purpose of this study. I use bipartisan 
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cosponsorship as an indicator of collaboration for a few reasons. First, cosponsorship is a 
broad measure of real collaboration. Cosponsorship represents a collaborative process in 
which legislators work together to craft and promote legislation (Bratton and Rouse 2011; 
Holman and Mahoney 2018).  Further, cosponsorship is a measure that is widely 
documented and is consistently practiced across Congresses, and is reported by 
representatives to be indicative of collaboration (Fowler 2006; Kirkland 2011; Rosenthal 
1981). Finally, cosponsorship is beneficial for policy making (Holman and Mahoney 
2018). Bills with a greater number of cosponsors contain more effective public policy, 
have a higher likelihood of passage, and promote future collaboration between the 
individual cosponsors (Adler and Wilkerson 2013; Gutmann and Thompson 2012; 
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002; Kirkland and Gross 2014).  
While cosponsorship is a strong measure of collaboration, and by extension 
bipartisan cosponsorship is a strong measure of bipartisan collaboration, the latter form 
comes with additional considerations. Cosponsorship means sharing credit for a bill when 
one might wish to have full credit (Rosenthal 1981). Bipartisan cosponsorship might also 
hurt the cosponsor’s relationship with his or her own party if they are perceived to be a 
traitor (Holman and Mahoney 2018). Given the high costs of bipartisan cosponsorship, 
such an act should not be considered a symbolic or meaningless act. Therefore, instances 
of bipartisan cosponsorship can be seen as evidence of a legislator reaching across the 
aisle in an intentional and impactful way.   
Roll call voting is perhaps the most commonly used measure of bipartisanship, 
and is seemingly the measurement of collaboration that gets the most media attention. 
However, I argue that roll call voting is not the strongest measure of collaboration for the 
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purposes of this paper. Andris et. al (2015) evaluate partisanship in the US House of 
Representatives by assessing all possible pairs of legislators to see how many times each 
pair voter the same way regarding roll call votes. They find that from 1949 to 2012, the 
probability of a cross-party pair occurring decreases substantially. They conclude that 
non-cooperation between political parties appears to have increased exponentially over 
time when evaluated solely using roll call voting. Nokken and Poole (2004) note that 
partisan alignment has a substantial effect on legislative behavior. They evaluate roll-call 
voting of Representatives and Senators that have changed political party in the course of 
their careers. They find that the most substantial changes in roll-call voting occur during 
periods of high polarization, from which they conclude that roll-call voting behavior is 
driven more by party alignment than ideology.  
Therefore, roll-call voting is therefore not the best measure of bipartisan 
intentions, as by the time a piece of legislation gets voted on, legislators are likely to toe 
party lines. Bipartisan cosponsorship offers legislators the opportunity to publicly show 
support for legislation initiated by an individual not in their party without the 
commitment of roll call voting outside of party lines. Measuring bipartisan cooperation 
using roll call voting could provide results that indicate that there is less bipartisan 
cooperation happening in the House than there actually is.  
Gender Differences in Legislative Activity 
There exists a large body of literature that examines gender differences regarding 
cosponsorship behavior. A few recent studies have attempted to evaluate the 
effectiveness of female legislators, both as sponsors and cosponsors (Anzia 2013; Paludi 
2016). Anzia and Berry (2013) use U.S. Congressional data to determine that female 
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legislators are more active legislators than men, in that they sponsor and cosponsor more 
legislation. They interpret these results to suggest that the existing public scrutiny of 
women allows for only the most outstanding female candidates to even reach Congress. 
Anzia and Berry argue that when real and perceived sex-based discrimination exists, as is 
indicated by survey data of voting-age adults (Dolan 2004), the women elected to 
Congress will outperform their male counterparts. They attribute this difference to what 
they call the “Jill Robinson effect,” named after groundbreaking African-American 
baseball player Jackie Robinson. Like Robinson, who was such a phenomenal talent that 
Major League Baseball chose to desegregate, females must prove that they are 
outstanding before they can even be elected to Congress.  
Paludi (2016) uses data from the 111th to the 114th Congress to determine 
differences in frequency of female cosponsorship of a bill based on the gender of the 
legislator introducing that bill. She finds that in that timeframe, female legislators 
cosponsored an average of 6.20 bills that were sponsored by other females, as compared 
to 4.07 sponsored by male legislators. Further, she notes that in the House, the female 
representative introduced 29.65 bills on average, while male representatives introduced 
27.2 on average in the same timeframe.  
My study relies on the assumption that female representatives and male 
representatives behave differently once elected to the House. Both of these previous 
studies support this assumption by providing evidence that females are distinct from their 
male colleagues regarding cosponsorship behavior. Anzia and Berry and Paulid’s papers 
provide background for my expectation of differences in bipartisan cosponsorship due to 
the presence of women. 
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Gender Differences in Cooperation 
 Additionally, much attention has been devoted to the study of gender differences 
in cooperation. Bauer et. al (2017) use Congressional data to evaluate what happens when 
female legislators refuse to compromise. They find that female legislators are likely to 
face harsher punishments from their constituents and in the media for refusing to 
compromise than will their male counterparts under certain conditions. They note, in 
particular, that women will face the harshest punishments for not compromising if the 
topic is considered a female issue, or one that disproportionately impacts females. My 
work can develop from the findings of this paper because Bauer et. al provide evidence 
that there are external factors driving women to act in a collaborative manner.  
 Holman and Mahoney (2018) evaluate the role that female caucuses have on 
collaborative behavior of women in state legislatures. Utilizing cosponsorship data from 
over 140,000 pieces of legislation in 2015, Holman and Mahoney determine that, in the 
presence of a caucus, the share of women in the legislature increases collaboration 
amongst women in a linear fashion. They also find that, in the absence of a caucus, the 
share of women in the legislature increases collaboration amongst women, but in a 
curvilinear fashion. That is, women’s collaboration increases until women reach a 25% 
share of the legislative body, and then decreases. However, given the presence of a 
women’s caucus in the United States House of Representatives, the former finding is 
more relevant to my paper. Holman and Mahoney’s findings are consistent with the 
critical mass theory, which states that women must first pass a threshold of representation 
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before they are able to implement policy changes. This paper provides evidence that the 
number of women in the legislature matters for collaboration. From this evidence I can 
further build upon my theory that increasing the number of women will foster bipartisan 
collaboration.  
Lawless et. al (2016) evaluate gender participation in consensus building 
activities and its effect on legislative outcomes. They look at two regularly-scheduled 
social activities in the Senate, the Secret-Santa gift exchange and Seersucker Thursday, to 
determine gender differences in non-political social engagement. They found that across 
time, women were more likely than men to participate in symbolic activities designed to 
promote a sense of collegiality. They note that research suggests that women are likely to 
prioritize relationships established in personal settings and, as a result, behave in a 
collegial manner. However, Lawless et. al conclude that there is very little evidence 
suggesting that women and men behave differently in procedural voting. The evidence 
that Republican women’s procedural vote scores are more bipartisan than men’s holds in 
four of the 14 Congresses. They attribute the lack of gender difference in bipartisan 
procedural voting to increasing severity of polarization between the parties. This paper is 
relevant to my study in two ways. First, given that this paper suggests female legislators 
are more likely to behave in a collegial manner, it provides context for the assumption 
that I will observe collaborative female behavior. Second, I will expand on the lack of 
evidence of differences in bipartisanship by using cosponsorship, a measure of legislative 
collaboration that is less sensitive to polarization.  
 There is an extensive body of research that attempts to determine gender 
differences in legislative behavior and cooperation. However, these papers have largely 
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been focused on overall legislative effectiveness, or female collaboration under specific 
conditions. None have ventured to determine the overall effect of female representatives 
on bipartisan cosponsorship at the chamber level, a measurement of collaborative activity 
that I argue is stronger than roll-call or procedural voting. This paper seeks to build upon 
previous literature by using a revised measurement of collaboration, and extend findings 
on bipartisan cosponsorship to the House of Representatives at the chamber level.  
 
 
 
 
III. Theory and Hypothesis 
 In this analysis I am interested in determining whether the increase in female 
legislators coincides with an increase in bipartisan cosponsorship. Specifically, I wonder 
if there an increase in the percent of cosponsors on a bill that are not from the original 
sponsor’s party as the number of women in the House of Representatives increases. Are 
women driving the change in bipartisan cosponsorship? I present two hypotheses and 
theories to answer this question. 
Hypothesis I: As the overall number of female representatives increases, there 
will be an overall increase in bipartisan cosponsorship regardless of party.  
Hypothesis II: There will be differences in the impact of female legislators on 
bipartisan cosponsorship when evaluated by party. Specifically: 
a) Democratic bipartisan cosponsorship will be greater than Republican 
bipartisan cosponsorship 
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b) Democratic women are driving the increase in bipartisan cosponsorship.  
 I argue for my first hypothesis based on two components informed by previous 
studies – differences between males and females regarding frequency of cosponsorship 
and expectations of a collaborative nature. I have presented evidence that females who 
are elected to Congress outperform their male counterparts by cosponsoring more 
legislation on average (Anzia and Berry 2012, Paludi 2016). Because of the biases 
against female leaders, only those that are exceptional are elected to Congress. I theorize 
that this exceptional legislative behavior extends to cosponsorship across the board. As 
the number of women increases, I expect to see an overall increase in cosponsorship of 
all kinds, including bipartisan cosponsorship.  
Additionally, I have presented previous literature that has found that females are 
more likely to participate in collaborative activities and are more collegial than their male 
counterparts. Women are likely to collaborate due to gendered socialization (Holman & 
Mahoney 2018), the tendency of females to establish deeper friendships with their 
colleagues (Lawless et. al 2016), and external pressure from constituents to compromise 
(Bauer et. al 2017). Therefore, I believe I will find gender differences in bipartisan 
cosponsorship over time regardless of party, since females collectively enter Congress 
with different behaviors and expectations than their male counterparts.   
 Although the literature that informs my first hypothesis is compelling, gender 
norms, cues and behaviors in a political context, like all norms cues and behaviors, rarely 
operate independent of the effects of other institutions (Reingold and Harrell 2010). 
While evidence suggests that female legislators as a whole operate in a way that is unique 
from male legislators as a whole, the reality of partisanship cannot be ignored or avoided. 
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It is for this reason that I propose a second hypothesis and theory regarding bipartisan 
cosponsorship in the context of party.  
There is literature which suggests that, when evaluating the behavior of female 
representatives, party matters. I argue for my second hypothesis based on two key 
components: the party breakdown of female legislators in the House of Representatives 
and party differences in tolerance of collaborative female behavior. Regarding the first 
component, while the overall number of female representatives has steadily increased 
over the time period of this study, the breakdown of this increase has not been even by 
party. I discuss the breakdown of female representatives by party in the “Descriptive 
Statistics” section. Given that the number of Democratic women has risen significantly 
more than the number of Republican women, I expect to find that the increase in 
Democratic cosponsors on Republican bills will be greater than the increase Republican 
cosponsors on Democratic bills, simply because Democratic women have more 
opportunity to impact the outcome variable.  
 I also argue that Democratic women will engage in more bipartisan cosponsorship 
due to differences in party norms and environment. Osborn (2012) finds that Democratic 
control of the state legislative body is associated with promotion of a women’s agenda, 
while Republican control is not. This suggests that women are more free to behave in a 
way that is unconstrained by explicit partisan agenda under Democratic leadership. 
Mahoney and Clark (2018) find evidence that women’s caucuses in state 
legislatures are more likely to form as the number of women increases if Democrats are 
in control of the legislature, but not when Republicans are in control. Caucuses are 
significant catalysts for collaboration in the legislative process, providing legislators with 
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information and an opportunity to express politically salient ideas (Hammond 1998). 
Women’s caucuses are additionally significant because they are an example of a truly 
bipartisan collaborative body, whereas members of Black, Latino and LGBT caucuses, 
for example, are almost always Democratic (Mahoney & Clark 2018). Given that female 
representatives are more likely create bipartisan collaborative bodies in a Democrat-
controlled legislature, it is possible that Democratic leadership will allow for more 
female-driven bipartisan activity than Republican leadership. As a result, Republican 
women will be less likely to cosponsor Democratic bills, possibly out of fear of upsetting 
party leadership by deviating from the partisan agenda. This theory is furthered by 
previously discussed evidence suggesting that bipartisan cosponsorship can be a 
politically costly action that can lead to an unfavorable view in the eyes of party 
leadership (Holman and Mahoney 2018).  
To determine what observations are driven by the differences between female and 
male legislators and what is the result of changes in political climate, it is essential that I 
control for other variables of interest. I outline my controls and considerations in the next 
section.  
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IV. Data Collection and Methodology 
In this study, I use cosponsorship data from the U.S. House of Representatives 
from 1993 (beginning of the 103d Congress) to 2010 (end of the 111th Congress). I 
selected this start date because there is not a significant number of women in the U.S. 
House of Representatives (<10%) before this time. The cosponsorship data is available 
through the United States Congressional Database via Congress.gov. The specific dataset 
that I use was pulled and compiled into .CSV format by Dr. M. Daniele Paserman 
(Boston University). The data I received from Dr. Paserman was in two different files, 
one containing bill information and one containing cosponsorship information. The 
“Cosponsors” CSV file contained the name, state, district, term, party, and gender of 
every cosponsor on every House Bill from 1991-2011. The “Bills” CSV file contained, 
for each bill introduced in the previously specified time period, the sponsor’s name, state, 
district, term, party and gender.  
I complete all of my data work and analysis using STATA. To convert the two 
datasets data into a single, workable dataset, I first collapse the “Cosponsors” dataset so 
that for each bill I can see the number of cosponsors, the number of cosponsors broken 
down by party, and the number of cosponsors broken down by gender. I then merge the 
collapsed “Cosponsors” dataset into the “Bills” dataset using a M:1 merge command in 
STATA. Next, I create the bipartisan cosponsorship percentages by party. To do this, I 
generate a variable called repbipart_percent that contained the number of Republican 
cosponsors divide by the total number of cosponsors multiplied by 100 if the original 
sponsor’s party was Democrat. I also generated a variable called dembipart_percent that 
contained the number of Democratic cosponsors divided by the total number of 
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cosponsors multiplied by 100 if the sponsor’s party was Republican. I combined these 
two variables into a variable called bipart_percent, which indicates the total percentage 
of sponsors that are not from the original sponsors’ party and includes both Democratic 
and Republican sponsors.  
I choose to look at the percentage of cosponsors that are not of the sponsor’s party 
as opposed to raw numbers, as it allows for a more accurate understanding of the 
magnitude of bipartisan support. For example, a number of the bills with bipartisan 
cosponsorship have one bipartisan cosponsor, but that one bipartisan cosponsor is the 
only cosponsor on the bill. Therefore, the one cosponsor actually represents 100% of the 
cosponsors on that bill. Alternative, one might argue that using percentage is misleading, 
since claiming that 100% of the cosponsors are not of the sponsor’s party implies that the 
bill had a level of support beyond a seemingly insignificant single cosponsor. However, I 
argue that, given that over three quarters of bills do not have any bipartisan cosponsors, 
even having a single bipartisan cosponsor implies that the bill has a significant level of 
bipartisan support. The histogram of bipart_percent is presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mason 19 
Figure 1: Distribution of Bipartisan Cosponsorship from the 103rd to 111th Congresses 
(Source: congress.gov)  
 
 
Controls  
 The first variable that I control for is political polarization aggregated to the 
chamber level. The most commonly cited measure of polarization, and that which is used 
to control for political polarization in this study, is the DW-Nominate Index developed by 
McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (1997). This model attributes a conservative score to 
legislators that vote with other conservatives, a liberal score with legislators that vote 
with other liberals, and a moderate score for those that vote with conservatives and 
liberals. An individual’s score is measured on liberal-conservative a scale from -1 to 1, 
with -1 indicating the liberal extreme, 1 indicating the conservative extreme, and zero or 
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close to zero indicating moderate. The scores for all legislators are aggregated by party to 
produce a mean polarization score for each party. A polarization score can then be 
attributed to each session of Congress by evaluating the mean difference in the mean 
score of each party. This mean chamber-level polarization score is what I will use to 
control for party polarization in this paper. The DW-Nominate Index indicates that 
political alignment of both parties has deviated towards the extreme over the time period 
of analysis. However, there are party differences in degree of polarization. The data on 
polarization in the House over time is displayed in Table 1.  
Table 1: Political Polarization from the 103rd to 111th Congresses 
 (Source: Poole and Rosenthal, 2014) 
Congress Year 
Chamber 
Polarization Score 
Mean 
Democratic Score 
Mean Republican 
Score 
                        
103 1993 0.727 -0.318 0.409 
104 1995 0.818 -0.343 0.475 
105 1997 0.854 -0.351 0.503 
106 1999 0.877 -0.35 0.527 
107 2001 0.913 -0.355 0.558 
108 2003 0.942 -0.354 0.588 
109 2005 0.976 -0.364 0.612 
110 2007 0.994 -0.347 0.647 
111 2009 1.016 -0.335 0.681 
 
 The mean political polarization score for the Democrats during the 103rd 
Congress was -.318 on the liberal-conservative spectrum, with positive indicating 
conservative voting behavior and negative indicating liberal voting behavior. The mean 
score for the Republicans on the same spectrum was .409. During the 111th Congress, the 
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Democratic and Republican political polarization scores were -.335 and .681, 
respectively. This indicates that while both the Democratic and Republican parties in the 
House have become more polarized, the Republican party has become more polarized 
than the Democratic party in the same time period.  
 I control for polarization in this study because I expect that the increased 
polarization over the time period of this study could be a rival explanation for bipartisan 
cosponsorship activity. I would expect that as the views of the members of each political 
party deviate from moderate, the members would be less likely to cosponsor legislation 
introduced by the other party. Because of this polarization, I would expect an overall 
decrease in bipartisan cosponsorship over time independent of gender composition. This 
effect would work counter to the effect of the increase in bipartisan cosponsorship that I 
expect as a result of an increase in female representatives. Therefore, I must control for 
polarization to ensure that the effect of women on bipartisanship is not driven out by the 
effects of political polarization.  
 I also consider which party is the majority party in the House of Representatives 
during each session of Congress. I do so using a dummy variable called democratic 
majority that equals one if the Democrats are the majority party in the House and equals 
zero if the Republicans are the majority party in the House. A summary of the House 
majority party for the years of this study is presented in Table 2.  
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Table 2: Majority Party in the House of Representatives from the 103rd to 111th 
Congresses 
(Source: United States House of Representatives Archives) 
Congress Year Majority Party 
103 1993 Democrat 
104 1995 Republican 
105 1997 Republican 
106 1999 Republican 
107 2001 Republican 
108 2003 Republican 
109 2005 Republican 
110 2007 Democrat 
111 2009 Democrat 
 
I include this control because the majority party yields significant responsibility 
that sets the tone for what will be accomplished during that session of Congress. 
Traditionally the Speaker of the House is a member of the majority party. The Speaker 
has profound influence on legislation and procedures in the House, and is responsible for 
ensuring that the legislation that is supported by the majority party is passed in the House. 
Additionally, the House majority party has the ability to assert influence over committee 
assignments and leadership. Krehbiel (1993) notes that by and large the partisan 
distribution of committees is roughly the same as the partisan distribution of the chamber 
overall. Aldrich and Rohde (1998) note that the majority party has significant influence 
over the assignment of committee leadership. Given that the majority party wields such 
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significant influence over the legislative process in the House of Representatives, I would 
expect that majority party would be closely related to my outcome variable.  
Additionally, as discussed in the “Theory” section, party influences the likelihood 
of collaborative efforts amongst female representatives (Osborn 2012; Clark and 
Mahoney 2018). This applies not only to looking at which party leadership will allow for 
more bipartisan efforts within their own party, but also for determining which chamber 
leadership will allow for more overall bipartisan efforts.  
I do find a statistically significant correlation between party in power and overall 
bipartisan cosponsorship, as well as cosponsorship broken down by party. The results 
between democratic majority and the three dependent variables are displayed in Table 3.  
Table 3: Correlation between Democratic Majority and Bipartisan Cosponsorship 
Democratic 
Majority rho p count 
Republican 
Bipartisan 
Cosponsorship 0.798 0.000 18 
Democratic 
Bipartisan 
Cosponsorship -0.760 0.000 18 
Bipartisan 
Cosponsorship -0.643 0.004 18 
 
I observe that Democratic control is associated with a decrease in Democratic 
cosponsorship on Republican-sponsored bills. This is what I would expect, since the 
party with legislative control is not forced to compromise as often to accomplish 
legislative goals. Similarly, Democratic control is associated with an increase in 
Republican cosponsorship of Democratic-sponsored bills, which I would also expect 
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since the minority party has little choice but to increase cooperation when it does not 
have control of the legislative agenda. I also find that Democratic power is associated 
with a net decrease in overall bipartisan cosponsorship, although this correlation is less 
strong than the bipartisan cosponsorship correlations by party.  
 
 
 
 
 
V. Descriptive Statistics 
Female Representatives 
 From 1993 to 2011, the number of women in the House of Representatives 
increased from 29, or 6.67% of all representatives, to 79, or 18.16%. However, this 
increase did not occur evenly between Democrats and Republicans. In this time period, 
the number of Democratic female representatives increased from 16 to 62, while the 
number of Republican female representatives increased from 13 to 17, peaking at 25 in 
the 109th Congress. The breakdown of number of female House representatives is 
displayed in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Female Representatives by Party from the 103rd to 111th Congresses 
 (Source: CAWP, 2018) 
 
Bipartisan Cosponsorship 
 In order to assess the changes in bipartisan cosponsorship over time as the number 
of women in the House increases, I must obtain the mean percentage of bills with 
bipartisan cosponsorship for each session of Congress. I do so by collapsing the variables 
repbipart_percent, dembipart_percent and bipart_percent by the Congress in which the 
bill was introduced. The mean percentages of overall bipartisan cosponsorship from the 
103rd to the 111th Congresses are displayed in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Percentage of Overall Bipartisan Cosponsorship from the 103rd to 111th 
Congresses 
 (Source: congress.gov) 
 
I find that the percentage of cosponsors on a given bill that are not from the 
original sponsor’s party increases from the 103rd to 108th Congresses, and that it steadily 
decreases during the 109th through 111th Congresses. The initial increase aligns with my 
first hypothesis that bipartisan cosponsorship increases over time; the subsequent 
decrease, however, does not support my hypothesis. This drop is particularly interesting 
because it corresponds with the most significant increase in the number of Democratic 
women during the time period of this study, from 46 females during the 109th Congress 
to 62 females during the 111th. 
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Bipartisan Cosponsorship by party 
 As previously discussed, although the overall number of female representatives in 
the House increased from 1993 to 2010, the increase was primarily driven by the 
Democrats. To understand bipartisan collaboration in the context of party I first break 
down bipartisan cosponsorship by party. The results are presented in Figure 4.    
Figure 4: Bipartisan Cosponsorship by Party from the 103rd to 111th Congresses 
(Source: Congress.gov) 
 
  
Throughout the timeline, the mean percentage of Democratic cosponsors on 
Republican bills is never lower than the mean percentage of Republican cosponsors on 
Democratic bills. When averaged across the nine sessions of Congress, the overall mean 
percentage of Republican cosponsors on Democratic bills (13.98%) is lower than that of 
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Democratic cosponsors on Republican bills (22.77%). This trend is consistent with 
Hypothesis II, since there is overall more Democratic bipartisan cosponsorship than 
Republican bipartisan cosponsorship.  
In Figure 4, I find that there is a steady increase in the percentage of Democratic 
cosponsors on Republican-sponsored bills until the 109th Congress, when a significant 
drop occurs. This is a similar trend to that of the overall percentage of bipartisan 
cosponsorship over time, and is again not what I expected given the large jump in the 
number of Democratic female representatives during this time period. However, for the 
percentage of Republican cosponsors on bills with Democratic sponsors, the opposite 
occurs. The percentage decreases steadily from the 101st to 109th Congresses, then peaks 
during the 110th Congress. Interestingly, this spike in Republican bipartisan 
cosponsorship corresponds with a decline in the Republican female representatives, from 
25 in the 109th Congress to 17 in the 111th Congress.  
 
 
 
 
VI. OLS Regression  
 I have highlighted that the descriptive data of bipartisan cosponsorship and female 
representatives do not align with Hypothesis I, but are more consistent with Hypothesis 
II. To determine if there is a statistically significant relationship between female 
politicians in the House of Representatives and bipartisan cosponsorship, I use an 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to estimate the parameters of a few models. In 
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the OLS models I collapse the data by year rather than by Congress, as this maximizes 
the number of observations that I am working with. It is important to note that, given the 
limited number of observations, I am unable to account for all of the variables that I 
would ideally control for. With this in mind, I specify a few unique models with different 
combinations of variables of interest1.  
Test of Hypothesis I  
I first estimate the following equation: 
P = ɑ + βoZ + β1 female + ε  
in which P  is the percentage of cosponsors on a bill that are not from the original 
sponsor's party; Z is the control vector accounting for chamber-level polarization2 and 
year3;  βo is the coefficient on the Z vector; female is the raw number of female 
representatives and β1 is the coefficient on the female variable; and ε  is an error term. I 
also run the same model a second time, substituting year for a dummy representing 
Democratic Majority. I choose to omit year in this model because it is highly correlated 
with polarization (correlation of .9731 and statistically significant). Therefore, since I 
keep the polarization variable throughout the models, it is not imperative that I include 
year.4 Again, due to the limited number of observations I was advised to limit the number 
of variables in the multivariate analysis, but my analysis would not be as robust without 
controlling for both polarization and party in power in some way. The results are 
                                               
1 Models were completed in consultation with Dr. Catherine Zimmer of the Odum Institute at the 
University of North Carolina.  
2 The polarization variable is multiplied by 100 in this regression analysis to determine the impact of 
increasing the polarization score by .01 rather than 1. 
3 It should be noted that I include year as a continuous variable in this model. In this way I account roughly 
for the impact of time from the start to end of the study, but do not have the isolated independent effect of 
each year. Given the data that I have, this was the best way that I could account for change over time.  
4 I ran the same model using democratic majority and year, and the results were nearly identical.  
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presented in Table 4 
 
Table 4: regression model on chamber bipartisan cosponsorship 
 Model 1 Model 2 
VARIABLES 
Bipartisan 
Cosponsorship 
Bipartisan 
Cosponsorship 
   
Females -0.212 -0.087 
 -0.131 -0.319 
Democratic 
Majority –– -2.397 
 –– -2.544 
Year -0.697 –– 
 -0.459 –– 
Polarization -.623*** -0.901 
 -0.176 -0.356 
Constant 1,370.66 16.797 
 -899.656 -13.189 
   
Observations 18 18 
R-squared 0.441 0.417 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
In model 1, the coefficient on the females variable is negative and significant at 
the 13% level. Since the p-value is relatively high, the statistical significance of this 
finding is relatively low. Therefore, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the 
overall number of women in the House increases the overall percentage of bipartisan 
cosponsorship and I therefore fail to reject the null hypothesis. The model also suggests 
that for every .01 increase chamber in polarization score, bipartisan cosponsorship 
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decreases by .623%. This finding is expected: as the ideology of representatives from 
both parties veers to the extreme, it makes sense that they would be less likely to support 
legislation from the opposite party.  
In model 2, once I substitute in the control for democratic majority, none of the 
variables are statistically significant. This suggests that the party in power is the most 
significant explanatory variable regarding bipartisan cosponsorship. The number of 
women in the House is not as significant a determinant of overall bipartisan 
cosponsorship. Again, this does not provide any support for Hypothesis I. 
From the findings in models 1 and 2, there is insufficient evidence to conclude 
that simply increasing the overall number of women in the House will directly increase 
overall bipartisan cosponsorship. However, this is not to say that increasing female 
representation is not important for increasing bipartisan collaboration. Since numerous 
studies (Osborn 2012, Mahoney and Clark 2018) have noted that party matters when 
determining the collaborative behavior of female representatives, the next step is to 
isolate the effect of increasing the number of Democratic women and the number of 
Republican women separately.  
Test of Hypothesis II – Democratic Women 
 I first test Hypothesis II by isolating the effect of an increase in Democratic 
women only. I test this effect on both Democratic cosponsorship of Republican-
sponsored bills and Republican cosponsorship of Democratic-sponsored bills. I test using 
polarization and year in models 3 and 4, and using polarization and democratic majority 
in models 5 and 6. The results are presented in Table 5.  
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Table 5: regression model on bipartisan cosponsorship accounting for change in 
Democratic women 
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
VARIABLES 
Democratic 
Bipartisan 
Cosponsorship 
Republican 
Bipartisan 
Cosponsorship 
Democratic 
Bipartisan 
Cosponsorship 
Republican 
Bipartisan 
Cosponsorship 
     
Democratic 
Females -0.479** 0.353*** -0.079 -0.093 
 -0.214 -0.109 -0.459 -0.171 
Year -0.99 -0.228 –– –– 
 -0.95 -0.404   
Democratic 
Majority –– –– -6.548 4.513*** 
   -4.995 -1.492 
Polarization -.972** -0.209 -.446 -.292 
 -0.398 -0.171 -.389 -.134 
Constant 1,933.58 472.509 20.386 13.890** 
 -1,853.43 -790.812 -17.151 -5.536 
     
Observations 18 18 18 18 
R-squared 0.546 0.554 0.58 0.684 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
In models 3 and 4, the coefficient on the democratic females variable is 
statistically significant, indicating that Democratic women are having an influence on 
bipartisan cosponsorship.  
Although model 3 indicates that the number of female Democrats is related to 
bipartisan cosponsorship, it directly contradicts Hypothesis II. Instead, this finding 
indicates that increasing the number of Democratic females decreases Democratic 
 
Mason 33 
bipartisan cosponsorship. I wondered if this was due to the possibility that once the 
number of women passes a certain threshold, women no longer feel the need to act in a 
more cooperative manner. This idea is based on the finding in Holman and Mahoney 
(2018) that female collaboration in state legislatures is curvilinear in nature. They argue 
that once the number of women passes a maximum threshold and surpases token status, 
collaboration becomes too costly and will decline. To test this, I ran the previously 
specified model adding a females squared variable. The results are presented in Table 6.  
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Table 6: regression model on bipartisan cosponsorship accounting for females squared  
 Model 3a 
VARIABLES 
Democratic 
Bipartisan 
Cosponsorship 
  
Democratic 
Females 1.379 
 -0.877 
Democratic 
Females Squared -0.018* 
 -0.009 
Polarization -.891** 
 -.304 
Year -1.13 
 -0.76 
 -0.009 
Constant 2,178.80 
 -1,488.02 
  
Observations 18 
R-squared 0.628 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 In model 3a once the democratic females squared variable is added, the 
coefficient on the democratic females variable becomes positive and statistically 
significant at the 14% level. The coefficient on the democratic females squared variable 
is negative and statistically significant at the 6% level. This implies that an increase in 
female representatives leads to a decrease in bipartisan cosponsorship once the proportion 
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of females becomes too high. This is consistent with the idea of a maximum threshold 
presented in Holman and Mahoney (2018).  
 The results of model 4 are interesting because they imply that an increase in 
female Democrats causes an increase in Republican bipartisan cosponsorship. I believe 
this finding actually does fit into my theory, when considered carefully. It is possible that 
not only are Democratic women driving bipartisanship by reaching across the aisle to 
cosponsor Republican legislation, perhaps they are making a concerted effort to recruit 
Republican sponsors onto Democratic legislation. This fits into Hypothesis II because it 
suggests that Democratic women are driving bipartisanship. It is possible that the 
Republican leadership is more tolerant of bipartisan efforts when it is not their female 
representatives driving the effort.  
 The lack of significance of the female variable in models 5 and 6 seems to 
indicate that party in power is the most significant explanatory variable for Democratic 
bipartisan cosponsorship. Once it is accounted for, the presence of female representatives 
becomes a weak indicator. In model 6, the coefficient on the democratic majority 
variable is positive and highly statistically significant. This means that when Democrats 
have control of the House, Republicans represent a higher percentage of cosponsors on 
Democratic bills. All of these findings reinforce that gender cannot be looked at 
independent of party when assessing bipartisan cosponsorship efforts. Democratic 
women are impacting bipartisan cosponsorship, but to look at this effect independently of 
partisanship results in an incomplete picture.  
Test of Hypothesis II – Republican Women 
 I next evaluate the the isolated effect of increasing the number of Republican 
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women on Republican cosponsorship of Democratic bills and on Democratic 
cosponsorship of Republican bills. I test using polarization and year in models 7 and 8, 
and using polarization and democratic majority in models 9 and 10. The results are 
presented in Table 7.  
Table 7: regression model on bipartisan cosponsorship accounting for change in 
Republican women 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
VARIABLES 
Republican 
Bipartisan 
Cosponsorship 
Democratic 
Bipartisan 
Cosponsorship 
Republican 
Bipartisan 
Cosponsorship 
Democratic 
Bipartisan 
Cosponsorship 
     
Republican 
Females -0.28 0.294 0.034 -0.074 
 -0.194 -0.452 -0.213 -0.419 
Year 0.580* -2.175** –– –– 
 -0.28 -0.929 –– –– 
Polarization -.289* -.116* -0.575 -.404 
 -0.16 -0.583 -0.801 -.138 
Democratic 
Majority –– –– 3.722*** -7.553*** 
 –– –– -0.774 -2.318 
Constant -1,114.918* 4,265.057** 17.222*** 22.578*** 
 -547.985 -1,813.06 -4.06 -6.997 
     
Observations 18 18 18 18 
R-squared 0.346 0.453 0.678 0.58 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
 Across all four models, the coefficient on the republican females variable is not 
statistically significant. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis II, since the isolated 
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effect of Republican women on both Republican and Democratic bipartisan 
cosponsorship is not significant. I believe this finding is related to the overall small 
number of Republican women – it is possible that this group does not have a profound 
effect on bipartisan cosponsorship simply because their numbers are not high enough to 
cause significant change. This finding is also consistent with the theory that Republican 
leadership is less willing to allow female collaborative behavior.  
 In models 7 and 8, polarization has a statistically significant negative effect on 
bipartisan cosponsorship, as expected. In model 9, the coefficient on democratic majority 
is positive and highly significant, and in model 10 it is negative and highly significant. 
This again indicates that party in power has a huge influence on bipartisan cosponsorship. 
When the Democrats are in control, Republican cosponsorship on Democratic bills 
increases and Democratic cosponsorship of Republican bills decreases. With this set of 
parameters, party lines is the primary factor determining bipartisan collaborative efforts.  
 
 
 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 In this paper I have evaluated what effect female representatives have on 
bipartisan cosponsorship. I find that the most significant predictor of bipartisan 
cosponsorship is party affiliation in relation to party in power – if you are in the majority 
party you do not have to reach across the aisle, and if you are in the minority party you 
will. This holds true regardless of the representative’s gender.   
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 When majority party is stripped away, however, the effect of women on bipartisan 
cosponsorship begins to emerge. While number of Republican women seems to have no 
significant effect on bipartisan cosponsorship, Democratic women do seem to be a 
driving factor. My data suggests that Democratic bipartisan cosponsorship increases as 
number of women increases until a maximum threshold is reached, at which point 
bipartisan efforts begin to decrease.  
 This project could be improved with more data. Unfortunately, the statistical 
power of the models presented is limited because of the small sample size. A larger 
sample size would also allow me to run a singular model with all of the controls 
incorporated instead of having to run separate models with different parameter 
specifications. It would be very interesting to repeat this study using data through the 
2018 midterm election and beyond to future years in which, hopefully, the House of 
Representatives will more closely resemble the demographics of the United States.  
Even if presence of women is not the sole, or even the most significant, factor 
driving bipartisan efforts, there are many arguments to be made for electing more women 
to office. Female legislators are more likely than their male colleagues to think of 
themselves as representing women and to consider females an important constituent 
group (Reingold 1992). High levels of female descriptive representation – that is females 
being represented by other females – leads to higher levels of efficacy for female citizens 
(Atkeson and Carillo 2007). Therefore female representation plays an important role in 
our democratic society by encouraging participation and trust in government. Finally, 
most simply put, electing strong female leaders breaks down long held societal norms 
about who can be a leader and which characteristics leaders exemplify. 
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